BREAKING: Jill Stein BREAKS SILENCE And Comes Forward With NEW Way To Take Down Trump… Not GOOD

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Dean James III% AMERICA’S FREEDOM FIGHTERS –

Now that Green Party presidential candidate Jill Stein is done with her fund raising disguised as a probe into the election results, we can finally focus on President-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration and MAKING AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! Or can we?

As it turns out, Jill Stein is back on the scene raising trouble again. For God’s sake, this freak is like a freaking COCKROACH- you just can’t get rid of her. It’s unbelievable.

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Apparently Stein refuses to accept the results of the election even though her worthless recount efforts in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin are done and showed nothing that would take Trump down. The Electoral College has cast its official vote and DONALD TRUMP IS OUR PRESIDENT!

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Now this green lunatic is taking it to the next level- she’s calling for further investigation of the election on the federal level, according to The Hill.

The team of attorneys Stein gathered to aid in her failed recount bid recently sent a letter to Attorney General Loretta Lynch requesting that Lynch launch a federal probe into the integrity of the U.S. electoral system.

Here it is in it’s entirety.

Re: Election integrity

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Dear Attorney General Lynch:

We are counsel to Jill Stein and the Stein Campaign in connection with the recounts she sought in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. We write to urge the Department of Justice to launch an investigation into the integrity of our nation’s election system generally, and our nation’s voting machines specifically, based on the information we discovered in the course of this representation.

The attempted recount process has uncovered that voting machines relied on in these states and across the country are prone to human and machine error, especially in under-resourced black and brown communities, and vulnerable to tampering and hacking.

The recount also found that the states’ efforts to protect their systems may be insufficient, particularly in low-income communities and communities of color. Each of these grave concerns warrants federal intervention.

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The Vulnerability and Unreliability of Our Voting Apparatus

The need for the recounts in these states was prompted in part by the vulnerability of the voting machines relied on in these three states. There are at least two types of vulnerabilities: susceptibility to malicious interference and poor performance. These reliability issues are magnified in communities of color, which the United States Commission on Civil Rights has found are often more likely to have their votes miscounted or tossed out than predominately white communities.

Voting Machines Errors and Election Day Problems

Optical scan machines are also prone to commit errors. The experts testified that optical scan machines do not consistently read light marks, misread hesitation marks, and give erroneous results if ballots are incorrectly fed into the machine, among other issues. When those machines are antiquated and not maintained appropriately, their performance is worsened. Add human error to that failing technology, and the result is thousands of votes not being counted.

The 2016 Election was marked by serious problems, which was only fully revealed during the recount process. The halted recount in Michigan provides powerful evidence of these problems. The recount was completed in 2,725 of Michigan’s 7,786 precincts, or just about one-third. In those precincts alone, over 1,600 votes were discovered never to have been counted. Thousands more would have been discovered had the recount continued. Every one of those voters was disenfranchised by machines that misread their ballots. The recount also revealed the terrible state of Michigan’s election machinery.

Machines throughout the state are over ten years old and many could not stand up to the stress of another Election Day. Michigan’s unusual election results also raise red flags regarding potential interference with election results. A very large number of votes cast contained no vote for president, which is known as the “undervote.” This year, 1.5% of the total vote in the state was an undervote—75,335 undervotes—a figure substantially higher than in recent presidential election years. The number of undervotes also dwarfs the 10,704 margin between the top two candidates.

In Michigan, over 87 voting machines broke on Election Day in Detroit alone, according to city election officials. The City Clerk Janice Winfrey reported that, although she had requested newer models from the state, they were never provided. Detroit, a city with heavy concentrations of minorities and low-income families, was effectively denied the opportunity to benefit from more reliable voting machines. Another problem that particularly plagued low-income areas in Michigan was the mishandling of ballots and other essential documents.

Multiple precincts in Detroit lost their poll books—the only record of whom and how many people showed up to vote. Nearly a quarter of ballots in Wayne County, which includes Detroit, were not securely handled, resulting in fewer ballots in ballot boxes than were recorded as having been issued, as well as improperly sealed and improperly transported ballot boxes.

In one dramatic example, one Detroit precinct’s sealed container that was supposed to hold the precinct’s 307 ballots after Election Day had just 52 ballots in it when it was opened to be recounted. Again, Wayne County was not alone. Nearly 11 percent of all precincts statewide that were examined during the recount were afflicted with similar irregularities.

And the worst cases were in some of the poorest counties. For example, problems were found in 24% of Cass County and Ionia County precincts, and in 27% of Branch County precincts. All three, along with Wayne, have per capita incomes substantially below the state median and are evidently not provided with sufficient resources to ensure that sufficient numbers of competent poll workers are hired, trained, and employed on Election Day and thereafter to secure the votes of all Michigan citizens.

In Pennsylvania, many voters who requested absentee ballots never received them in time to cast their vote. There were so many problems with absentee ballots that a Montgomery County judge ordered a four-day extension of the deadline to return them, warning that 17,000 people could be disenfranchised without an extension. Voters also reported issues with DREs that appeared to inaccurately record their votes on Election Day. The “no vote” button on Sequoia AVC Advantage machines in Montgomery County remained lit even after voters attempted to press other buttons to vote for candidates. Voters feared that their votes were inaccurately counted as “no votes.” Indeed, the election results for Montgomery County included 4,087 “no votes”—meaning either that 4,087 people implausibly went to their polling places only to vote for no candidate in any election, or that the machines did not work.

Cyber Vulnerabilities – and the Inaccuracy of FBI Director Comey’s Testimony

The optical scan and direct-recording electronic (“DRE”) voting systems used throughout the country rely on computers with reprogrammable software, making them vulnerable to bugs, malware, or intentional alterations. Our nation’s leading cyber-security experts have analyzed these machines and concluded that a reasonably skilled attacker can easily infect the voting machines with malware or other alterations, which can cause the machines to provide any result of the attacker’s choosing. Professor Alex Halderman, the Director of the Center for Computer Security and Society at the University of Michigan, has personally hacked into several voting machines as part of a research study, including the optical scan model used in Michigan. He was able to do so within minutes. Similarly, Dr. Harri Hursti has developed a series of tests demonstrating how easily the voting results of the studied machines could be altered. These computer scientists are the opposite of luddites. They embrace electronic tabulation of the vote but insist that we recognize computers’ vulnerabilities—and thus use paper verification.

How could a cyberattack occur given FBI Director James Comey’s sworn testimony to Congress that no election machines are ever connected to the internet? See Ex. A at 48, 63 (“Those things are not connected to the internet.”). First, Director Comey’s testimony is inaccurate. The administrator of the Wisconsin Elections Commission testified under oath that some voting machines connect to the internet: “[S]ome of the newer equipment [referring to voting machines] does have modems that operate using wireless Internet. And so after the polls close, then when those unofficial results are transmitted, in some cases they could be transmitted. That instantaneous transaction would be conducted over the Internet.” Ex. B at 125 (transcript of testimony of M. Haas, Nov. 29, 2016). One such machine that has internet connectively, according to the vendor’s own marketing materials, is the ES&S DS200, which processes optical scan ballots. We understand this new ES&S DS200 model is in broad use in approximately 25 states around the country.

Second, even where the voting machine is never itself connected to the internet, each voting machine connects to other machines that are connected to the internet to obtain the ballot software for each election (among other reasons). The Wisconsin Elections Commission administrator testified that private vendors provide “removable media”—basically, a thumb/USB drive—with that ballot software prior to each election. Ex. B at 105-106. In Wisconsin, that removable media transfers software from computers under the control of a private vendor, and is then “inserted into the voting machine before the election.” Id. at 106. Wisconsin has no rules requiring private vendors to protect their computers from cyberattacks. Id. at 105-106. Those private computers may be exceptionally vulnerable to attacks and any malware that is installed on the vendors’ computer can be transferred, through the removable media, to voting machines across the state. In this way, a hack of one vulnerable machine located in a private office could propagate a devastating cyberattack far and wide, even in states where election administration is decentralized. According to elections experts, processes similar to Wisconsin’s, in which electronic voting machines are programmed with software transferred from computers in government or private offices that are likely connected to the Internet, occur nationwide. No national cybersecurity standards for these computers exist.

When California and Ohio conducted comprehensive reviews of electronic voting systems, both states discovered vulnerabilities in every voting machine studied. For instance, 30% of Pennsylvania voters use the Election Systems & Software iVotronic (a DRE machine); the Ohio Secretary of State found easily circumventable security protections and vulnerabilities in this machine that could be exploited to introduce malware. 29% of Pennsylvania voters use the Danaher Shouptronic 1242, a DRE model that was introduced in the 1980s, has not had its security features updated in thirty years, and “lost” about 200 votes in a 2005 election in Pennsylvania.

A federal district court judge in Michigan said it best: “The vulnerability of our system of voting poses the threat of a potentially devastating attack on the integrity of our election system.” Stein v. Thomas, No. 2:16-cv-14233, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 7, 2016)

Insufficient Checks to Ensure our Voting System’s Integrity

In light of the vulnerability to cyberattacks and the problems with our voting machines, a system of checks to ensure the accuracy of the vote is imperative. As one cybersecurity expert testified, our election system must adopt the mantra of “trust but verify.” Unfortunately, our verification system is inadequate for at least four discrete reasons.

First, our verification system is inadequate because too many votes are tabulated with no paper trail whatsoever. In Pennsylvania, more than 85% of voters vote on DRE machines with no paper trail. These Pennsylvanian voters cannot know whether the machines have accurately recorded their votes. Unfortunately, 15 states have no paper trail for some or all of their votes. 6 Only approximately 70% of voters nationwide have their votes recorded on some form of paper. Thankfully, Wisconsin and Michigan have paper trails for each vote, 7 which was crucial for recount efforts.

Second, even when paper records are available, too often those paper records are ignored in favor of a machine recount. “Recounting” a vote using the machine that originally counted the vote is meaningless; one expert compared it to seeking a second opinion from the same doctor. Yet that is what happened in 21 Wisconsin counties which chose to use machine recounts in whole or part, ignoring the best evidence of the voter’s intent—the paper ballots the voters completed on Election Day.

Third, recounts are too difficult to obtain to serve as the requisite check. In Michigan, though the Board of State Canvassers initiated a recount based on Dr. Stein’s petition, the state Court of Appeals stopped the count by reading into the state law a requirement that a candidate petitioning for a recount must establish that a recount could result in her winning the election. Attorney Gen. v. Bd. Of State Canvassers, No. 335947, 2016 WL 7108573 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2016), appeal withdrawn, No. 154862, 2016 WL 7189651 (Mich. Dec. 9, 2016), and appeal denied sub nom. Trump v. Bd. of State Canvassers, No. 154868, 2016 WL 7189653 (Mich. Dec. 9, 2016), and appeal denied sub nom. Gen. v. Bd. of State Canvassers, No. 154886, 2016 WL 7189664 (Mich. Dec. 9, 2016). This decision offers no standards for determining when a candidate is close enough to winning to request a recount, and will likely be cited to try to limit future recount petitions.

In Pennsylvania, candidates cannot initiate recounts. That task falls to voters. This year, voters who sought to confirm that their votes had been accurately recorded by requesting recounts were thwarted by a byzantine, unworkable legal regime. Three voters in each of the 9,158 election precincts in Pennsylvania must submit notarized affidavits to obtain a recount in that precinct. Whether a voter must request a recount in the county board of elections or in court depends on when his county finishes counting votes.8 But county boards do not routinely disclose when they finish counting, and two of the state’s largest counties (Allegheny and Delaware) admitted in court that their boards of elections do not comply with the legally mandated process for completing the count. Not even the state’s top election officials knew when various counties had finished counting the vote; they provided inaccurate and contradictory information in response to inquiries from the Stein Campaign. As a result of erroneous guidance from the Pennsylvania Department of State and county boards’ erratic compliance with shifting and secret deadlines, thousands of voters had valid recount petitions wrongfully rejected.

And the costs of recounts are prohibitive as well. Wisconsin estimated the cost at approximately $3.5 million (though the final amount may be higher or lower); Dr. Stein had to pay that amount before the recount began. In Pennsylvania, thousands of individual voters must pay a total of $457,900 in order to request a statewide recount (in addition to potential court filing fees of over $100 or even $200 per petition), and the Commonwealth Court demanded a $1 million bond from the voters who filed a contest proceeding. The financial burdens in Pennsylvania are so severe that they make anything close to a statewide recount practically impossible.

Fourth, none of the three states have any effective audit procedures. While Wisconsin and Michigan require a post-election audit, it does not require the audit to be completed before certification of the vote totals. And in Wisconsin, the audit is of a small sampling of the vote based on no discernible statistical methodology. As a result, our expert statistician testified that the audit cannot be expected to reliably detect errors or tampering. In Pennsylvania, the audit procedure is fundamentally inept because most voters vote on machines that have no paper trails and the audit does not include a forensic review of the voting machines.

Conservative Tribune reports that it is worth noting that there was no widespread fraud or evidence of vote-tampering uncovered in the recounts, which had been the primary allegations behind the push for the recounts in the first place, according to The Washington Times.

Nevertheless the attorneys are now pointing to outdated voting machines and a supposed plethora of uncounted ballots or ballots lacking a vote for a presidential candidate as reason for the feds to step in and conduct a nationwide review of the entire system.

Considering Attorney General Lynch only has a couple of weeks left on the job and any actual investigation would be likely to expose the Democrat Party fraud that many suspect occurs in certain precincts, it seems unlikely that this latest effort by Stein to derail and invalidate the incoming Trump administration will go anywhere.

Please share this on Facebook and Twitter to spread the word that Jill Stein is at it again, this time demanding that Attorney General Lynch open a federal investigation of the U.S. electoral system.

God Bless.

Dean James III% AMERICA’S FREEDOM FIGHTERS

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